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There is a rising scientific interest in
the neuroscience behind contemplative
practices (see e.g., Vago and Silbersweig,
2012 for a review), including movement-
based practices such as yoga and tai chi.
Given that, it becomes important to ask
how such contemplative practices differ
from Western movement practices such
as dance. In both dance training and
contemplative movement, one learns to
control the body very precisely, and this
requires an assortment of mental skills as
well. As a practitioner of both classical
ballet and contemplation, and as a neu-
roscientist who studies contemplation, I
will examine how the neural and men-
tal causes and consequences of movement
training differ between dance and contem-
plation. Ballet, rather than modern dance,
serves as a good contrast for contemplative
practice, because modern dance itself has
been influenced substantially by contem-
plative practice (Hay, 2000). I will compare
classical ballet and movement-based con-
templative practice on the dimensions of
(i) cultivation of attention, (ii) develop-
ment of interoception, (iii) cultivation of
meta-cognition, and (iv) emotion regula-
tion. To date, there are limited studies of
movement-based practices, for the obvi-
ous reason that movement tends to create
artifacts in neuroimaging and EEG mea-
sures (e.g., Gwin et al., 2010). I will point
out important gaps in our neuroscientific
understanding of these phenomena. The
results have implications for how we con-
duct studies of contemplative practitioners
and dancers.
CULTIVATION OF ATTENTION
The first thing that happens when engag-
ing in contemplative practice is the
cultivation of attention. There is a rich
literature on how contemplative practice
trains sustained attention (MacLean et al.,
2010), attentional stability (e.g., Lutz et al.,
2009; van Vugt and Jha, 2011), the ability
to deal with conflicting information (Jha
et al., 2007), and so on. While most of
the research on attention has been done
on sitting meditation, embodied practices
such as tai chi have been shown to affect
attention as well (e.g., Kerr et al., 2008).
These behavioral effects are accompanied
by specific changes in the brain as well:
for example meditation has been associ-
ated with an increase in phase-locking to
presented stimuli, thought to reflect more
selective attention (Lutz et al., 2009), and
increased modulation of 7–14 Hz alpha
oscillations thought to reflect the direction
of attention to relevant inputs (Kerr et al.,
2011).
The training in ballet too requires sub-
stantial attentional focus, since it involves
sustained attention to the details of
muscle tension and location of body
parts, situational awareness of where the
other dancers are, and memorization
of movement sequences. Cultivation of
focused attention is generally reflected in a
strengthening of the fronto-parietal atten-
tion network that consists of most impor-
tantly the intraparietal sulcus, medial
frontal gyrus, inferior frontal gyrus, and
anterior cingulate cortex (Corbetta and
Shulman, 2002; Dosenbach et al., 2007). It
would therefore be interesting to compare
the developmental trajectory of fronto-
parietal attention network use over the
course of dance and contemplative train-
ing, which both require thousands of ded-
icated hours of practice (Slagter et al.,
2011). In fact, changes in dedicated neural
circuits are already slowly starting to
be uncovered (see e.g., Lazar et al.,
2005; Hänggi et al., 2010 for reports of
brain structure changes in meditators and
dancers, respectively).
INTEROCEPTION
There has been some controversy on
whether contemplation helps to improve
interoception. Interoception refers to the
ability to feel your body. It is measured
in tasks such as the counting of heart-
beats. It may not be improved very much
by contemplative practices that empha-
size sitting still (Khalsa et al., 2008; Sze
et al., 2010; Daubenmier et al., 2013),
but there is some evidence that it does
improve in practitioners of tai chi (Kerr
et al., 2008). This is interesting, because
improvements in awareness of the outer
body have been associated with improve-
ments in motor control (e.g., Wong et al.,
2012). Moreover, long-term meditation
practice has been associated with, among
other things, increased cortical thickness
in the right anterior insula (Lazar et al.,
2005), a brain structure crucial for intero-
ception (Critchley et al., 2004) (note that
this was found in a group of Vipassana
meditators, who focus a lot on sensations
of breathing in their practice).
Based on these findings, one could
imagine that ballet dancers, who are pre-
occupied with their body all day, have a
good sense of interoception. However, an
equally likely hypothesis is that dancer’s
interoception is not different from the gen-
eral public, since ballet dancers judge the
shape of most of their movement in mir-
rors and are trained to ignore pain sig-
nals from their bodies since “the show
must go on.” (McEwen and Young, 2011).
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Many ballet dancers even feel the need to
resort to yoga, gyrokinesis, or pilates to
attune themselves to their bodies again. In
contrast, contemporary dancers typically
work without mirrors, and focus more on
interoceptive signals.
Consequently, I predict that there is
a clear difference between dance forms
in the extent to which interoception is
developed. Since in classical ballet, dancers
tend to rely more on mirrors to cor-
rect their position and create the desired
shapes with their body, I predict classi-
cal dancers have an interoceptive accu-
racy not different from non-dancers, while
for modern dancers, who tend to rely
less on mirrors, there should be superior
interoceptive accuracy compared to non-
dancers. One study that investigated the
relationship between interoceptive accu-
racy (in that case, for emotions) in both
dancers and meditators showed that med-
itators were the most accurate, followed
by dancers, who were still more accurate
than participants from the general pop-
ulation (Sze et al., 2010). However, this
study did not separate modern from clas-
sical dancers. Studies of the neural cir-
cuitry underlying interoception in dancers
are missing altogether. So, even though
interoception is likely to be trained in
both dance and contemplation, the jury is
still out.
META-COGNITION
A third mechanism that is crucial for
both dance and contemplation is meta-
cognition. Meta-cognition could be
defined as a process of re-describing its
knowledge to yourself and comparing it to
predictions you have made (Timmermans
et al., 2012). In other words, meta-
cognition involves observing your own
thoughts. Meta-cognition is crucial for
monitoring of whether your cognitive
processes are developing along the lines
you intend to (for example: are you paying
attention to that letter on the screen, or
are you day-dreaming about what to have
for lunch?), and if necessary adjusting
them. For ballet dancers, meta-cognition
is necessary for checking whether their
attention is divided appropriately between
monitoring the use of the correct muscles,
monitoring the location of fellow dancers,
thinking ahead in the memorized move-
ment sequence, and often also creeping in
the skin of the character or emotion they
are trying to convey.
In contemplation too, meta-cognition
is crucial (Kuan, 2012). Meta-cognition
helps the yogi to check the alignment of
their body, and observe their thoughts and
emotions as those unfold, making sure
not to get caught up in them. Rather
than simply mindlessly performing move-
ments, there is an emphasis on observ-
ing how movement affects the body and
mind. In addition, meta-cognition is nec-
essary to observe the appropriate bal-
ance between tensing and relaxing (e.g.,
Wallace, 2008). While meta-cognition has
not been specifically investigated in the
context of movement-based practices, it
has in general been associated with BOLD
activity in the dorso-medial prefrontal cor-
tex and the anterior insula (Schilbach
et al., 2012). In more cognitive tasks,
meta-cognition appears to rely more on
lateral prefrontal cortex and anterior cin-
gulate cortex (Fox and Christoff, 2014).
This is consistent with the idea that a
crucial determinant of meta-cognition is
working memory capacity. Working mem-
ory strategies are what allows the meta-
cognitive processes to maintain multiple
pieces of information simultaneously and
to transform those for alternative needs,
e.g., simultaneously maintaining the loca-
tion of fellow dancers with the memorized
sequence of steps.
Interestingly, while ballet dancers
tend to use meta-cognition to ensure
that they are still delivering the cor-
rect product (dance) to the audience,
contemplatives use meta-cognition to pri-
marily observe their own mental state.
The meta-cognition that dancers use,
in view of a project delivery is typically
highly critical and judgmental, while
yogis train to observe their mind and
body with a non-judgmental attitude.
It could even be said that an important
function of meta-cognition in contem-
plation is monitoring whether or not one
is reacting judgmentally. Consequently,
comparing dancers and contemplatives
on meta-cognition would be an inter-
esting way to isolate externally-directed
from internally-directed meta-cognition.
Moreover, it will be interesting to see
whether those two types of meta-
cognition are associated with different
neural correlates, along the lines of
the suggested difference between meta-
cognition of emotions and bodily state
versus cognitive states (Fox and Christoff,
2014).
EMOTION REGULATION
Emotion regulation is an umbrella term
for many processes that serve to influ-
ence emotions and align them with ones
goals (Todd et al., 2012). It includes reap-
praisal of events, suppression of emo-
tional reactions, avoidance, coping, and
more. An important part of training in
many contemplative practices, including
movement-based contemplative practices
involves techniques of dealing with emo-
tions that could be classified as emo-
tion regulation. Specifically, practitioners
cultivate the ability to observe emotions
but withhold automatic elaboration and
action tendencies that flow from these
emotions. Many contemplative practices
also have an element of dealing with emo-
tions by refocusing attention on a dif-
ferent stimulus, such as the breath or
physical sensations. Not surprisingly then,
yoga has been used in the treatment of
war veterans with Post-Traumatic Stress
Disorder (da Silva et al., 2009). Some
regions that are important for emotion
regulation, the lateral prefrontal cortex
and orbitofrontal cortex, have been shown
to have larger activity and density in med-
itators (e.g., Farb et al., 2007; Hölzel et al.,
2008; Grant et al., 2010). These areas are
thought to be engaged in emotion regula-
tion by modulating activity in areas such
as the amygdala, striatum, and hippocam-
pus (see Vago and Silbersweig, 2012 for a
discussion).
Yet I argue that ballet training too,
involves some cultivation of emotion
regulation skills. Many professional and
non-professional dancers describe their
dancing as a way to express their emo-
tions, as a kind of catharsis, which is
in fact controlled enhancement of emo-
tions (Ochsner et al., 2004). Not sur-
prisingly, many types of dance therapy
have been developed to deal with emo-
tional turmoil (e.g., Betty, 2013). I pre-
dict that dance therapy and sustained
training in dance modulate the connectiv-
ity between lateral prefrontal cortex and
orbitofrontal cortex on the one hand and
the amygdala and hippocampus on the
other.
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On the other hand, we should also note
a crucial difference in the way emotions are
experienced in ballet versus contempla-
tive movement practices. While in dance,
particularly in theatrical performance, the
goal is to experience emotions to the
fullest, in contemplative practices emo-
tions are seen as merely an expression of
the mind that arises but also disappears
again. One could say, in dance emotions
are magnified and objectified, while in
contemplative practice, the fleeting nature
of emotions is emphasized, which actu-
ally makes them decrease in magnitude
and importance. Recently, it has been sug-
gested that the “stickiness” of emotions is
accompanied by a prolonged response in
the amygdala (Schuyler et al., 2014). If this
is true, this amygdala response should be
increased in dancers relative to contem-
plative practitioners (but note that more
regions than just the amygdala are involved
in producing the full-blown experience of
emotions; Anderson and Phelps, 2002).
So, while professional dancers and con-
templatives both work on adapting and
regulating their emotions, they do this in
different ways.
SYNTHESIS AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS
I have shown how there are many com-
monalities between classical ballet and
contemplative movement practices, in the
domains of attention training, interocep-
tion, meta-cognition and emotion regula-
tion. Yet, ballet training and contempla-
tion also differ in the presence of a non-
judgmental attitude and importance given
to emotions.
While the behavioral correlates are rel-
atively well-described, the neural pathways
remain under-explored. Furthermore,
these commonalities and differences
between dance and contemplative move-
ment practices could have implications
for the studies we do. For example, using
ballet dancers as a control group for long-
term contemplative practitioners could be
very interesting, because both populations
have developed a strong focus on their
craft over a life-time of concentrated prac-
tice, and developed skills in the domain
of attention, meta-cognition, interocep-
tion, and emotion regulation. In contrast,
the groups differ in their non-judgmental
attitude and solidity ascribed to emo-
tions. Comparing these groups therefore
allows one to tease apart the judgmental
and non-judgmental modes of attention,
meta-cognition, and emotion regulation,
and could thereby help define its neural
and behavioral correlates.
In addition, it would be interesting to
engage dancers and practitioners of con-
templative movement practices together
in neurophenomenological experiments.
Neurophenomenology (Varela, 1996;
Cosmelli and Thompson, 2007) involves
analyses of brain activity informed by dis-
ciplined introspection on the part of the
participants. Since both of these groups
of people have spent considerable time
observing and honing their bodies and
minds, such experiments could help to
elucidate the detailed mechanisms behind
these types of training, as well as the
time course of the arising of judgmental
attitudes.
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